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AbstRAct
The European Central Bank (ecb) has received 
a lot of criticism for its too little, too late per-
formance to ease market pressures during the 
economic crisis. At the same time, the ecb and 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) have managed the 
new economic realities that have emerged in 
the international context differently. Despite 
the criticisms, the European Central Bank is 
the European Union institution that has as-
sumed more control due to the new model 
of economic governance of the eu.
Why did the Federal Reserve act so nim-
bly and quickly to calm the markets, while the 
ecb was so cautious in managing monetary 
policy? The aim of this paper is to perform a 
comparative analysis of the management of 
central banking and the crisis.  
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interest rates and other monetary policy mea-
sures undertaken by the Central Bank and the 
Federal Reserve during the economic crisis, 
as well as to understand the changes in the 
context of the ecb and the emergence of its 
authority within the European Union’s eco-
nomic governance model since 2011. Thus, 
in order to carry out a scrupulous exposition, 
we will also limit the time frame of this study 
to the 2007-2014 period.
Key words: European Central Bank, 
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ropean Union
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el Banco central y la crisis. 
un análisis comparativo  
de las medidas tomadas  
por la reserva Federal  
y el Banco central europeo, 
y el cambiante papel  
de la bce en el sistema de 
gobernanza económica  
en la unión europea
Resumen
Han sido múltiples las críticas que ha recibido 
el Banco Central Europeo (bce) por sus actua-
ciones too little, too late en la crisis económica 
para aliviar las presiones de los mercados. El 
bce y la Reserva Federal (fed) han gestio-
nado la crisis siguiendo tiempos distintos. A 
pesar de estas críticas, el bce es la institución 
comunitaria que más poder ha ganado en el 
nuevo modelo de gobernanza económica de 
la Unión Europea (ue).
¿A qué se debe que la Reserva Federal ac-
tuara de forma tan ágil y rápida para calmar a 
los mercados y el bce haya sido tan cauto en 
su gestión de la política monetaria? El objetivo 
de este artículo es realizar un análisis com-
parativo de la gestión de los tipos de interés y 
otras medidas de política monetaria del bce y 
la Reserva Federal durante la crisis económica, 
y que este nos ayude a entender mejor los cam-
bios en el ámbito del Banco Central Europeo 
y la emergencia de su poder en el modelo de 
gobernanza económica de la Unión Europea a 
partir de 2011. Así, con el fin de proceder a un 
estudio más profundo, limitaremos el marco 
temporal de este al periodo 2007-2014.
Palabras clave: Banco Central Europeo, 
Reserva Federal, política monetaria, crisis, 
Unión Europea
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IntRoductIon
In recent years, mainly since 2007, central 
banks have started to play an exceptional 
role in public life as a result of the economic 
crisis, especially the Federal Reserve (Fed) and 
the European Central Bank (ecb). Before the 
crisis, it was usual for most parts of society not 
to know who the president of the ecb was. 
However, today many citizens do recognise 
Mario Draghi. Surprisingly, even those who 
are not specialists in the matter may also know 
Janet Yellen, the president of the Federal Re-
serve. From a European perspective, the case 
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of the ecb and its president is an especially 
interesting one. We are not surprised that 
Mario Draghi’s statements appeared in the 
news and the press, and even competed with 
nationally relevant stories within the time of 
broadcast. There is no doubt that the actions 
taken by the Federal Reserve and the European 
Central Bank have been present throughout 
the crisis, and therefore, so have the comments 
and the judgments about the responses that 
both central banks have articulated.
Since its first signs, the criticisms of the 
ecb’s measures were constant. Although analy-
sis of advanced data and warnings from inter-
national financial institutions indicated that 
the risk of the crisis expanding into Europe 
could have far-reaching consequences, while 
the Fed lowered its interest rates in mid-August 
2007, the ecb decided to apply the same mea-
sure in October 2008. In other words, one year 
after the Federal Reserve’s actions have been 
taken and when all the alarms have sounded. 
Only then did the institution that was entrust-
ed with the management of monetary policy in 
the eurozone start to use the aforementioned 
instrument to respond to market concerns. The 
question must be asked, then, why did the Fed 
act so nimbly and quickly to calm the markets, 
while the ecb was more cautious in managing 
monetary policy? The aim of this paper is to 
perform a comparative analysis of the manage-
ment of the interest rates and other monetary 
policy measures undertaken by the European 
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve during 
the economic crisis, as well as to understand 
the emergence of the ecb’s authority within 
the European Union’s economic governance 
model since 2011.
Although both, the Federal Reserve and 
the European Central Bank, managed the 
monetary policy of their particular area, they 
are institutions that differ not only in its ori-
gins, but also (and mainly) on their objectives, 
and therefore, the effects of their actions are 
different. The Fed was founded before the 
ecb, and has a much longer tradition of facing 
the negative effects of crises. Moreover, en-
dowed with a broader objective than that of 
the European Central Bank, it performs in 
very close coordination with us government 
authorities. The Fed has a common goal with 
the us government, which is to be a unique 
interlocutor when it comes to implementing 
its policy. Instead, the ecb is a recent institu-
tion established over time, as a result of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union, 
on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty with 
one specific objective: market price stability. 
However, that goal has proven to be insuf-
ficient to cope with the economic crisis and 
the complex environment of the nineteen eu 
member states. The eu being very heteroge-
neous, where each one has its own voice and 
presents different realities.
Therefore, among this comparative analy-
sis and limiting its time frame to the 2007-
2014 period, we will firstly examine the dif-
ferent actions the ecb and the Federal Reserve 
have taken since the beginning of the crisis. 
Secondly, assuming that the characteristics 
and the environments of each of these central 
banks were different (due to their mandates 
and the systems of economic governance in 
which they operate), we will evaluate the rea-
sons and factors that have marked the behavi-
our, timing and scope of their interventions. 
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On the other hand, this study aims to help to 
understand the new situation of the European 
Central Bank, the changes in its context, as 
well as the emergence of its authority within 
the European Union’s economic governance 
model since 2011. This is due to the assump-
tion of new functions related to the supervi-
sion of the efs and the emergence of the ecb 
as a more credible body in the eu (according 
to the Eurobarometer 2014). Finally, we will 
outline the conclusions, which will reflect 
on the future of eu institutions, the features 
and the power they need to be given to fulfil 
their objectives within the European Union.
the peRfoRmAnce of the economIc And 
polItIcAl AuthoRItIes. the pARtIculAR 
Role of the fedeRAl ReseRve And 
the euRopeAn centRAl bAnk
After the end of the Iraq war in 2003, eco-
nomic growth in the United States of Ame-
rica and Europe had been accompanied by 
a continued increase of interest rates. The 
American interest rates, between 2004 and 
2006, increased from 1% to 5.25% (Figure 
1), and remained stable at this level until Au-
gust 2007. In the euro zone the ecb increased 
them stepwise since early 2006 (when the 
interest rates stood at 2%) to the highpoint 
of 4.25% in July 2008 (Figure 1). Whether 
the management of monetary policy pursued 
by the central banks before the crisis was 
correct or not, will not be part of this analysis. 
However, since its beginning, there have been 
numerous studies examining the role of central 
banks, mainly the Fed and the ecb (Diamond 
and Raján, 2009; Baldwin, 2009; González 
Páramo, 2011) in relation to the high rates 
of economic growth and low interest rates in 
the short and long term dynamics, as well as 
their impact on the accumulation of risks in 
the financial system.
Beyond these considerations, between 
2004 and 2006, subprime loans (mortgages 
linked to weak borrowers) in the United 
States of America exceeded 40% of the total, 
beco ming contracted at a variable rate and 
indexed at the central bank rate. According to 
the International Monetary Fund, the number 
of mortgages had doubled since 1996. The 
housing prices, which had already started to 
fall a year before (in early 2007), began to 
suffer a steeper decline. In February 2006, 
the Federal Reserve began to estimate loss 
data for bankruptcies of mortgage banks, still 
far from the scale of figures from April 2007. 
Since July 2007, the global stock markets have 
shown increasing volatility fluctuations. Ac-
cording to the statements of Ben Bernanke 
(then chairman of the Fed) in July 2007, the 
Federal Reserve estimated that the subprime 
crisis in the United States of America could 
be valued at more than 100 billion dollars and 
influenced not only the American markets, 
but also the European, by the interplay of 
private debt markets (cnnexpansión, July 19, 
2007). Concurrently, in the summer of 2007, 
the record of the Dow Jones Index surpassed 
14,000 and the global stock markets began 
to show signs of exhaustion.
As the scope of the risks that entities 
had taken in the form of by-products was 
unknown, the uncertainty and changing esti-
mated figures generated a crisis of confidence 
among the banks themselves. The suspicion 
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spread very quickly, affecting not only the 
value of shares of funds involved in real estate 
(whether they were solvent or not), but also 
the value of the shares of banking groups. The 
monetary crisis evolved into the stock market 
crash, primarily affecting North America and 
Europe, and later Asia, as well. Policymakers 
then began to act to alleviate the liquidity 
crisis. On August 17, the Fed reduced interest 
rates half a percentage point and issued early 
warnings about the general economic outlook 
regarding the extension of the banking crisis 
(El Mundo, 2007).
Although in August 2007 the size of the 
liquidity problems and solvency of the finan-
cial institutions were unknown, the central 
banks began to take steps to secure access to 
those entities to finance from the international 
markets. Therefore, each central bank (based 
on its own characteristics and tools at its 
disposal) intervened in the markets in order 
to ease tensions related to obtaining market 
liquidity and to restore confidence among the 
institutions themselves, which was the main 
reason why the credit flow had been reduced.
The role of central banks proved deci-
sive, but government authorities also played 
an important role in the management of the 
economic crisis by supporting measures taken 
by those responsible for monetary policy. At 
the same time, the economic and political 
authorities intervened in the economy and 
social life to maintain the solvency of financial 
institutions and restore confidence between 
them and to calm the stock market turmoil 
and reassure depositors’ savings (Noeth and 
Sengupta, 2012). Therefore, all those measures 
had been in essence technical, but policy and 
legal initiatives were also decisive to limit the 
risks and support the actions of central banks 
with mandatory measures (Hernández de Cos, 
2010). Thus, in this study we will focus on the 
actions taken by the Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank. However, the wider 
scope of those interventions cannot be unders-
tood without analysing the political measures 
introduced by the us congress, eu institutions 
and national governments. Furthermore, since 
the crisis was a global phenomenon and it has 
affected many different structures of citizens’ 
lives, the answers turned out to be exhaustive 
and coordinated not only between national, 
but also international economic and politi-
cal agents.
Despite eight years of interventions from 
economic and political authorities and the 
improvement in some economic data, the 
macroeconomic variables are still showing 
signs of weakness and the risks seem to re-
main. According to the imf Global Financial 
Stability Report (April 2015), it is the euro 
zone where the economic crisis has led to an 
institutional recession and has increased the 
model of integration. Therefore, we examine 
measures taken by the Federal Reserve, un-
derpinned by the actions of us governmental 
institutions. Secondly, we analyse the solutions 
that have been implemented by the ecb, the eu 
institutions and the governments of member 
states. Finally, we proceed with a comparative 
analysis of the Fed’s and ecb’s management 
of monetary policy.
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the federAl reserVe’s And the euroPeAn CentrAl 
BAnk’s PerforMAnCe during the Crisis
Since the beginning of the crisis, the measu-
res undertaken by the Federal Reserve were 
reflected in the management of its interest 
rates and the changes in its balance sheet. The 
Fed’s interventions, especially when compared 
with other central banks, were swift in action. 
While the first clear signs of the liquidity crisis 
and the difficulties of financial institutions to 
remain financed appeared in June 2007, in 
July of the same year the Federal Reserve (in 
coordination with other central banks such as 
the ecb and the Bank of England) intervened 
in the markets by pumping liquidity into the 
system. A month later, its interest rates were 
lowered for the first time.
These early issues, which had been classi-
fied as liquidity problems of some American 
banks, transferred to Europe in September 
2007. Northern Rock (United Kingdom) 
became the first English entity rescued by 
the Bank of England due to liquidity pro-
blems. The same month the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(oecd) started to lower economic growth fore-
casts for the G7 (oecd Economic Outlook, nº 
82, December 2007). The Federal Reserve’s 
functions included promoting full employ-
ment, economic growth and price stability, 
but also to maintain the stability and contain 
risks that may arise in the financial system. It 
undertook different strategies during the first 
year of its actions, which included cutting 
interest rates and injecting liquidity through 
open market operations. As an example, the 
Fed lowered the interest rates to 4.75% a fort-
night after doing it for the first time.
Moreover, a large number of negative 
corporate news stories forced the central banks 
to proceed with another liquidity injection. 
In late October, the Fed dropped its inter-
est rates to 4.5%. November and December 
issued more unfavourable business and bank-
ing news, which encouraged central banks to 
continue injecting liquidity into the market. 
In December, the Federal Reserve lowered its 
interest rates further to 4.25%. In January 
2008, it was reduced by another three-quarters 
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of a point (to 3.5%), placing them (at that 
time) below the ecb rate.
Based on Ben Bernanke’s recommen-
dations about the need for fiscal stimulus, 
the us Congress reached an agreement on 
tax relief and tax cuts to revive the economy 
(Blinder and Zandi, 2010). A week after the 
latest interest rate cut, the Federal Reserve 
placed it at 3%. As growth forecasts continued 
to shrink under poor business prospects, in 
March 2008, the Federal Reserve reduced its 
rates to 2.25%. Meanwhile, central banks 
continued to pour liquidity into the financial 
system without achieving its aim to calm the 
turmoil and negative business expectations. 
In April 2008, the International Monetary 
Fund acknowledged that the United States 
of America was likely to enter a recession. 
At the same time, central banks continued 
to act together to inject liquidity into the 
system (it was the ninth intervention in the 
case of the Fed).
In June 2008, the Fed auctioned 75 billion 
dollars in loans to help entities with credit 
problems and the us government continued 
to support troubled banks; one example was 
the nationalisation of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac (Granell Trias, 2009). Furthermore, on 
July 30, 2008, the us House of Representatives 
approved a housing rescue plan worth 300 
billion dollars. In August, the Federal Reserve 
auctioned another 25 billion dollars in loans. 
In September 2008, the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy and the purchase of Merrill Lynch 
by Bank of America became a clear turning 
point of the crisis. The same month, the Fed 
and the current us government nationalised 
the world’s largest insurer, aig.
The described situation has exposed the 
need of governmental action to be not only 
more coordinated, but also much stricter. In 
November 2008, due to the dimensions of the 
crisis and its depth in the real economy (as 
evidenced by data the imf reported the same 
month), the G20 met in Washington to dis-
cuss the problems that were threatening the 
global economy. Additionally, the fsb (Finan-
cial Stability Board) was created. Its aim was 
to analyse the global changes that had to be 
made in relation to the international financial 
system (Tobias, 2013). Even if the Washington 
meeting cannot be defined as a new Bretton 
Woods, it had a major impact on the future 
reforms that were taken later on. It marked a 
new philosophy and recognised that existing 
risks were global. It also underlined the need 
of acting jointly on changing the regulation 
and supervision scheme of the international 
financial system. In the same month, with 
the objective of generating more liquidity in 
the markets (by purchasing financial assets) 
the Fed announced the beginning of the qe 
(Quantitative easing) programme. After the 
Washington meeting, the support provided by 
international financial institutions (particu-
larly the International Monetary Fund) was 
strengthened, while credit facilities began to 
be implemented.
Due to the escalation of the crisis, in 
December 2008, the us government (at the 
behest of the president of the Federal Reserve) 
doubled its public debt by carrying out a 700 
billion dollar bailout to purchase toxic assets 
with the notion of reselling them once the 
situation was stable. The aim of that mea-
sure, combined with other actions, was to 
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generate greater confidence for depositors and 
taxpa yers. The deposit insurance limit, pre-
viously up to 100,000 dollars, was increased 
to 250,000 dollars (Granell Trias, 2009). In 
March 2009, us Treasury Secretary (Timothy 
Geithner) also announced the creation of 
public-private partnerships. Popularly called 
bad banks, these entities were established to 
acquire loans and toxic securities in order to 
sell them on when more favourable condi-
tions existed.
Therefore, two sets of technical measures 
were implemented by the central banks. The 
Fed lowered its interest rates nine times since 
2007 and chose not to raise them at any point 
during the same period of time. Since January 
2009, it placed them at 0.05%. At this point, 
the Fed’s interest rates remained in the range of 
0-0.25%. Both measures had a direct impact 
on monetary policy. Due to the escalation of 
the crisis in late 2008, the Federal Reserve 
lost its leeway for further action in terms 
of using interest rates as a monetary policy 
measure. Since 2009, it undertook another 
set of measures, in the form of Quantitative 
Easing. Its first phase, applied from March 
2009 to March 2010, had a global cost of 
600 billion dollars and was complemented 
with two other phases. The second one, from 
November 2010 to September 2011, which 
received a total amount of 600 billion dollars, 
and the third one from September 2012 to 
October 2014. Although the liquidity injec-
tion has been declining gradually throughout 
2014, all together, the qe phases increased the 
Fed’s balance to 4 trillion (Figure 2).
The arrival of Barack Obama to the 
White House in January 2009 facilitated the 
public intervention plan and the implementa-
tion of the first tranche of qe. Later on, there 
was a G20 meeting, celebrated in London 
in April 2009, to discuss the current global 
situa tion, as well as to create a new schedule to 
restructure the financial system’s supervision 
and regulation methods. Much more effective 
than the Washington conference, it established 
the types of measures to be implemented by 
the G20 countries and initiated changes in the 
European Union’s economic governance model 
(implemented since 2011).
fIguRe 2. ecb bAlAnce (tRIllIons of euRos) / fed bAlAnce (tRIllIons of dollARs)
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Therefore, between 2007 (the beginning 
of the liquidity crisis) and 2009, open market 
operations and the management of interest 
rates became the main measures to comple-
ment government actions. However, from 
2009, as we have seen before, due to the escala-
tion of the crisis, the Federal Reserve’s ability 
to employ the interest rates as a reactivating 
measure vanished. All those new measures (qe, 
the establishment of the bad banks and other 
legal solutions) were also supplemented with 
fsb actions, all under the hypothesis of global 
risks pressure and the need of international 
coordination between different actors, states 
and/or financial institutions.
The coordination of the Fed’s monetary 
policies and the ones pursued by government 
authorities has been key for the outcomes of 
these economic stimuli. The agility of the us 
central bank has been possible thanks to its 
more ambitious goals and the existence of a 
single government interlocutor to implement 
those goals. However, the European Central 
Bank, the mandate of the European Bank, the 
peculiarity of the European System of Central 
Banks and the enormous complexity of the 
European macroeconomic scenarios arising 
in the global economic context, defined the 
range of its capability in tackling the effects 
of the crisis. Furthermore, the limitations of 
the ecb’s monetary policy mandate, its de-
pendence on member states in the field of 
application of tax policies and assumptions 
to act, as well as the lack of a single EU go-
vernment, restricted its leeway.
Since mid-2007, the ecb acted through 
open market operations, but did not change 
its interest rates. In early October 2008, due 
to the dimension that the crisis was taking, 
the Presidents of France, Germany, Italy and 
Great Britain gathered in Paris at an emer-
gency meeting. A few days later, the interest 
rates of the major central banks were reduced 
in a joint operation to prevent the financial 
crisis from turning into a recession. It was the 
first time during the crisis that the ecb lowered 
its interest rates, to 3.75%. The follo wing day 
Wall Street registered a major collapse of stock 
markets, the first since 1987. Between Octo-
ber 2008 and July 2009, the ecb reduced its 
interest rates eight times (from 4.25% to 1% 
in May 2009). In July 2011, it increased them 
again to 1.5% due to the fear of inflationary 
pressures. In December 2009, the European 
Central Bank lowered its interest rates to 1%, 
reducing them gradually to 0.05% (Septem-
ber 2014).
‘Still, based on its broad security assets 
system and by introducing massive liquidity 
into the system, the European Central Bank 
reacted in a steeper way than other central 
banks, taking advantage of entity instru-
ments (González-Páramo, 2012, pp. 90-91). 
Through such measures, based on facilita-
ting adjustment operations and other regular 
monetary policy operations, the ecb tried to 
eliminate mistrust and possible paralysis of the 
interbank market caused by the insolvency of 
Lehman Brothers. Thus, the ecb has not only 
acquired a crucial role in the context of the 
interbank market (becoming a safe haven label 
for deficit entities), but also did so without 
having to change its operational framework 
significantly. Moreover, it introduced onto 
its balance sheet the operations formerly exe-
cuted by financial intermediaries, reduced 
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the interbank market and executed a role of 
guarantor of last resort.
Additionally, in order to improve its re-
sults, the ecb also applied some extraordinary 
measures. In May 2009, it proceeded with the 
acquisition of cover bonds (60 billion euros) to 
encourage the liquidity of the partially para-
lyzed market segment responsible for provi-
ding funds to banks (Ayuso and Malo de Mo-
lina, 2011, pp. 54). Secondly, it implemented 
some temporary configuration changes in the 
long-term refinancing operation (ltro). Those 
expansionary and unconventional measures, 
implemented (in its new form) in December 
2011 and in February 2012, totalled around 
1 trillion euros (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2011). It provided a fixed rate (1%), 
had no quantity limit, and disposed of the 
extended term (from three months to three 
years). Among other introduced modifica-
tions, the extension of the range of eligible 
collaterals and the moderation of the admis-
sion criteria (Malo de Molina, 2013, pp. 116) 
were also found.
The Washington and London meetings, 
held in 2008 and 2009 respectively, as well as 
the Laroisière report (2009) gave way to the 
creation of a European System of Financial 
Supervision (esfs). That is to say, the Euro-
pean Union’s particular network (with the Eu-
ropean Central Bank partial participation) to 
promote the system’s transparency, to exercise 
solvency control over the entities and to create 
a small and medium enterprises protection 
mechanism (Puente, 2013). However, because 
of its insufficiency and further banking union 
needs, some modifications were needed.
In addition, the complexity of the crisis 
forced the member states to redefine the eu’s 
supervision and economic governance system, 
putting special emphasis on the euro zone. 
The establishment of various mechanisms 
and modifications carried out under the eu 
institutional organisation chart have strength-
ened the European Central Bank’s role in the 
community context. The ecb, involved in the 
design and implementation of the new system 
of European economic governance and in 
limiting the negative effects of the economic 
crisis, was a guarantor for the price stability 
objective and inclusion in the whole reform 
process, as well as in the adjustments applied 
by different member states. In each case, it 
supported faster consolidation, the broader 
strengthening of the national banking systems 
and the establishment of a new framework for 
macroeconomic surveillance.
The inadequacy of used mechanisms, the 
worsening of the sovereign debt crisis within 
the euro zone (especially the Greek situation), 
the operational miscarriage of the European 
Financial Stability Facility and the risk of 
failure for correct monetary policy transfer 
browbeat the European Central Bank into 
two covered bank bonds purchase programs 
(the first one, already mentioned before, ap-
plied in May 2009 and the second one en-
forced in October 2011 for a total value of 
100 billion euros) and the Securities Markets 
Programme (smp) implementation. Through 
the last one, the ecb bought bonds of member 
states with greater financial pressure (Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy).The risk 
premium level was the only criteria to be con-
templated, while the emitter conditions, the 
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terms and/or the interest rates risk have not 
been considered. Moreover, even though the 
indirect debt monetisation entailed a break 
with the spirit of Articles 123 and 125 of its 
Statute, the ecb sought to please the liquidity 
needs of its recipients and to influence their 
spending decisions. However, the euro zone’s 
difficulties obliged the eu’s central bank not 
only to extend the smp, but also to take a 
number of additional measures in order to 
alleviate the crisis.
Fourth, the dangerous summer that Spain 
lived in 2012, the critical economic situa-
tion of the Italian economy and the possible 
breakup of the euro prompted the president 
of the ecb to deliver on July 26 of this year 
historical statements on safeguarding the sta-
bility of the euro area. Because of this situa-
tion, the European Central Bank activated 
the Outright Monetary Transactions (omt) 
through which it sought to settle financial 
stability within the euro zone. The omt, by 
request of a member country, would begin 
the process of buying the government debt 
of these states (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 
2012: 5). Firstly, those which have been pre-
viously rescued by the European Financial 
Stability Facility or the European Stability 
Mechanism. And secondly, those who met the 
Memorandum of Understanding agreement 
and thirdly, those member states which also 
recovered the ability to place on the market 
its 10-year bonds. Like the Programme for the 
Securities Markets, the Monetary Operations 
Purchase would also be neutralised by the 
liquidity adjustment operations in order to 
avoid potential inflation. For now, in relation 
to its implementation, the only countries able 
to benefit from this rescue activity were Ireland 
and Portugal. However, its close compliance, 
improving markets and falling risk premium 
in target countries caused the omt not to enter 
into force until 2012.
Furthermore, the publication of the re-
port Towards a Genuine Economic and Mone-
tary Union prepared by the presidents of the 
European Council, the European Commi-
ssion, the Eurogroup and the European Cen-
tral Bank and the subsequent report by Her-
man Van Rompuy was a clear impetus for 
future completion of the emu. Through a 
process of negotiation and legislation, deve-
loped between 2012 and 2013, it was decided 
to establish a banking union community with 
the aim of strengthening the structure of the 
Economic and Monetary Union of the eu and 
to limit potential financial contagion between 
different member states. Based on two pillars, 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (mus) and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism (mur), its 
structure has been further strengthened by the 
Harmonised Deposit Guarantee Scheme and 
is under a single system. Its main objective is 
to ensure the soundness of the banking system 
and the integration of the euro zone, and to 
reinforce its stability and financial integrity. 
Thanks to the mus, from November 2014, 
the ecb became a single banking supervisor 
acquiring a number of new functions. Since 
then, it directly evaluates the financial viability 
of the 128 banks in a systemic manner and 
3,500 entities indirectly. Meanwhile, through 
the mur, member countries also established a 
system for resolving entities in the euro area 
with liquidity problems. Single Fund sup-
ported the resolution; the Single Settlement 
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Mechanism seeks to minimise the costs of 
potential bank failures.
Finally, in late 2014 the European Cen-
tral Bank adopted two new long-term refi-
nancing operations (tltro) in order to grant 
new loans and limit the compliance of pre-
viously applied programs of the same nature 
(Bank of Spain 2014, pp. 19). It also launched 
programs for simple guaranteed bank bonds 
and securities from securitisations totalling 40 
billion euros. For the purchase of private debt 
they acted not only in the primary markets, 
but also secondary.
Still, the depletion of the interest rates as 
a monetary policy instrument because of its 
approach to zero (zero lower bound) in Sep-
tember 2014 limited the effect of the relaxa-
tion of monetary conditions. The lack of ef-
fectiveness of the actions implemented on the 
balance sheet of the European Central Bank 
and the goal of price stability in the medium 
term led to the expansion of its activities with 
the implementation of quantitative easing 
(qe). Through this unconventional measure, 
from March 9, 2015, the ecb acquired the 
debt of public entities of the member states, 
worth 60 billion euros per month. Additiona-
lly, the purchase of bonds of up to 30 years 
even with negative interest (maximum 0.2%) 
proceeded. It was expected that this activity, 
conducted in secondary markets, would not 
just level the interest rates in the long term 
by giving a boost to the economy in order to 
reactivate it, but also lower the risk premium 
of recipient countries and encourage invest-
ment as well as credit flow to the real economy 
of the eurozone. Moreover, while the total 
budget of the qe range is about 1.14 billion 
euros, if necessary, possible extension is not 
ruled out beyond September 2016.
In summary, there has been a wide varie-
ty of monetary policy management strategies. 
Today we can say that they even show disparity 
and contradiction. While the Fed withdrew 
the stimulus through the end of the qe plan 
in October 2014, the ecb began to implement 
an expansionary monetary policy through 
the European qe plan in early 2015. In the 
medium term, the ecb’s expansionary policy 
could lead to a devaluation of the euro and 
create a movement of capital to the us.
During the crisis, the Fed opted to use 
liquidity and lower the interest rates from 
August 2007 and to purchase toxic assets from 
the market (like other central banks, such as 
the Bank of England) from 2008. However, 
the ecb acted like a bank by injecting mar-
ket liquidity. Likewise and according to its 
mandate, when inflationary pressures were 
pointed out, it cut interest rates in October 
2008. However, after 2009, it was unable to 
use interest rates as a tool of monetary policy 
and it was necessary to implement other 
measures. In some cases, it attempted to cir-
cumvent regulation that bars governments 
and other funding, such as the role of the 
single banking supervisor on the grounds of 
art. 127 tfeu (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the eu) in order to avoid the reform of the 
treaty and therefore unanimity.
the reAsons for the differenCe in BehAViour 
By the federAl reserVe And the eCB
The Federal Reserve and the ecb have been 
entrusted with the management of monetary 
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policy; however, the behaviour of the two 
central banks differs in several ways:
Firstly, the liquidity crisis had its origin 
in the us but it spread rapidly, resulting in 
a crisis of solvency of financial institutions, 
in a stock market crisis and ultimately into 
a global economic crisis. However, the early 
symptoms began in early 2007, and focused 
on the us housing market. On the one hand, 
it is consistent that the Federal Reserve was 
the first central bank to act because the crisis 
mainly affected the North American markets 
in the beginning. Moreover, financial markets 
were deeply interrelated and, as the president 
of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke warned 
in the summer of 2007, the extension of us 
risks to other markets was inevitable. There-
fore, the different interventions coordinated 
by the central banks were to improve liquidity 
in the system through open market operations. 
The fsb, at their meeting in Washington in 
November 2008, stressed that the risks were 
global and that cooperation between States 
was necessary to prevent them.
‘Secondly, and the key to the various 
interventions is the difference in mandate 
between the Federal Reserve and the ecb. 
The European Central Bank, created on June 
1, 1998, replaced the European Monetary 
Institute (emi). That is, the interim body res-
ponsible for strengthening ties between the 
central banks of the member states and their 
respective monetary policies, leading to the 
future constitution of the European System 
of Central Banks (escb) in order to manage 
the process of monetary union of the eu. 
Currently the escb comprises the ecb (the 
cornerstone) and the national central banks 
(ncbs) of all member states. It also contains in 
its framework a temporary monetary authority 
of the euro zone. According to Article 127 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union the primary objective of the European 
System of Central Banks (and also the ecb), 
responsible for the design and implementa-
tion of monetary policy in the euro area is to 
maintain price stability below 2%. In addi-
tion, it should facilitate compliance with the 
general eu objectives described in Article 3 
of the Maastricht Treaty to strengthen the 
performance of eu policies in order to ensure 
full employment, non-inflation and balanced 
economic growth, as it will operate on the 
principle of an open market economy with 
free competition. Still, this contribution will 
be of secondary importance against its purpose 
relative to inflation.
Undoubtedly, the subordination men-
tioned was the main factor that influenced the 
activity of the European Central Bank over 
the crisis, explaining its delay in following 
the footsteps of the us Federal Reserve and 
balancing the extent of its activity and the 
implementation of characteristic measures of 
a moderate economic policy. As for the instru-
ments of monetary policy of the European 
Central Bank, they are closely linked to their 
functions. In addition to maintaining price 
stability, the ecb seeks to control interest 
rates and to manage short-term liquidity in 
the money market. It also evaluates financial 
market conditions in order to preserve its 
stability and integration. For these purposes, 
it has standing facilities, open market opera-
tions and a reserve requirements mechanism 
(Cecchetti and O’Sullivan, 2003, pp. 33-34). 
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Still, the virulence of the macroeconomic 
situation forced the European Central Bank 
to implement a series of measures unconven-
tional in character and to adapt amid the crisis 
to new functions not only in the context of 
monetary policy, but also in the context of 
financial supervision, increasing the flexibility 
of its scheme of action. Among the main ex-
traordinary monetary tools, described above, 
temporary configuration changes, operations 
long-term refinancing, the Programme for the 
Securities Markets Programme, the Monetary 
Operations Purchase fund, ultimately lead-
ing to the approval (in September 2014) of 
quantitative expansion.
The organisational structure of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks, the public, and 
their procedural legitimacy supported by the 
escb and the ecb, in addition to the ordinary 
legal regulation of the eu, has also influenced 
the development of its performance in the 
years since the crisis, changing the effective-
ness of its efforts. The inability to exercise a 
single speaker, the lack of completeness of the 
configuration of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and the heterogeneity of national sce-
narios in member countries were other key 
factors in this context.
With regard to the ecb’s independence, 
because none of the agencies belonging to the 
escb may solicit or receive pressure from any 
eu institution or national government of the 
member states, the aim of this truly compre-
hensive condition remains in favour of price 
stability. In this way, financial mechanisms 
available to the ecb are isolated from the rest of 
the community mechanisms, ensuring a pro-
cess of autonomous decision making that has 
functional independence and does not have 
strong community control over its actions. 
However, it was threatened by pressures from 
national governments, because the mandate 
of the European Central Bank was different 
from the objectives of the eu institutions and 
the States of the euro area. Additionally, the 
lack of adequate institutional solutions and 
the complexity of the scenarios of the crisis 
have shown that the member countries need 
different monetary policy responses. Thus, the 
existence of the nineteen different partners 
in the euro area that had significantly dispa-
rate problems hindered the articulation of a 
single monetary policy by the ecb, which was 
balancing effectiveness and inviting them to 
extend its mandate.
Furthermore, the establishment of the 
Federal Reserve was the result of a set of dif-
ferent causes from the case of the escb. In 
particular, a series of bank panics in the early 
twentieth century, the losses of depositors, and 
the lack of a sufficiently flexible and stable us 
financial system led ( based on the December 
23, 1913 Federal Reserve Act) to the merger of 
all national banks and the creation of the Fed 
(Sprague, 1914, pp. 213-214). Its mandate, 
like the ecb, is to define and implement the 
monetary policy of the State, keeping interest 
rates at a moderate level over the long term 
and ensuring price stability. However, in the 
case of the Fed (unlike the escb), in order to 
keep inflation and growth, they have the same 
level of importance (Cecchetti and O’Sullivan, 
2003, pp. 33). Also, the structure of the mul-
tidimensional character of the US, through 
which the interests of different regions, diffe-
rent groups (the public, traders and bankers), 
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as well as public and private sectors are all 
organised, effectively facilitated the applica-
tion of an efficient monetary policy response 
to the crisis, which was quickly implemented 
and consistent with the objectives set by the 
US government.
The Fed’s goals are broader than those 
of the ecb. The Fed is also responsible for 
controlling the rate of unemployment, so 
the variety of tools at its disposal is much 
broader, such as gathering measures of mone-
tary, fiscal and financial stability. The Federal 
Reserve also acts as supervisor and regulator 
of banks in order to safeguard the stability of 
the banking and financial system, it dictates 
the credit rights of consumers and provides 
financial services to depository institutions of 
the government and official foreign bo dies. 
Unlike the ecb, the Fed was a guarantor of 
last resort since the beginning of the crisis, 
which greatly facilitated its task and increased 
the effectiveness of its measures. That is, the 
difference in strategy explains the differences 
mainly in relation to interest rates. The Federal 
Reserve lowering the interest rates is upheld in 
its mandate to stabilise the financial system. 
Unlike the ecb, which has a priority mandate 
of inflation control, so that if it wanted to act 
in accordance with its objectives it should use 
inflationary pressures to justify its interven-
tion (see figure 3).
The problem is that what was asked of the 
ecb by the states during the crisis was a more 
agile and closer performance in secondary 
endpoints, according to its statutes, to boost 
the economy with expansionary policies that 
encourage growth and job creation. Therefore, 
the ecb has gained new features throughout 
the crisis and has consolidated its mandate. 
However, these functions are not covered by 
its statutes. That is, it has no legal basis in 
other similar circumstances that allow it to 
act without control with a mandate of price 
stability as a priority.
Moreover, the ecb and the Fed could 
no longer use interest rates as a management 
tool of monetary policy after 2009, because 
these were near zero. Therefore, they had 
to articulate a series of measures in the case 
of the ecb involving the acquisition of new 
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capabilities, not only as a guarantor of last 
resort, but also completing its objectives as 
sole banking supervisor.
While both central banks are indepen-
dent, the European Central Bank stands as 
the most independent central bank in the 
world. The Federal Reserve is autonomous 
in theory, but less so in practice. To identify 
the origins of the ecb we must go back to the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Maastricht where 
the philosophy of the so-called economist 
group triumphed over the so-called monetarist 
group. The monetarist group (led by Germany 
and Luxembourg in particular) wanted a 
politically independent central bank, while 
the economist group (led by France, Belgium 
and Italy) preferred a more political central 
bank, with more challenges and a structure 
linked to the objectives of the Community 
institutions. The result is that there is close 
coordination between the policies of the us 
government and the actions of the Fed. How-
ever, the ecb’s objectives and member states 
have a different hierarchy. Therefore, during 
the crisis we have seen monetary policy mea-
sures which collided with the fiscal policies 
of some member states that needed priority 
economic growth and employment over the 
inflationary pressures, such as the rise in in-
terest rates in July 2011. Moreover, the Fed 
does not have the same degree of sovereignty 
that the European Central Bank has. It has 
accountability to Congress and must take any 
changes made by the Congress of the us in its 
statutes. That is, the opposite of the escb. In 
addition, the amplitude of measures that can 
be applied creates a scenario of potential risk 
to the independence of the Federal Reserve, a 
scenario that we observed in the context of the 
crisis, but impossible to rebuild in the case of 
the European System of Central Banks (Ayuso 
and Malo de Molina, 2011, p. 60).
Another important difference is that the 
Fed has had a single partner throughout the 
crisis to coordinate government policy. How-
ever, the ecb has nineteen different partners 
with different problems. It has great difficulty 
in articulating a single monetary policy for all 
its heterogeneous states. Both the different 
member states of the euro area and the diffe-
rent states of the US were affected unequally 
by the crisis. There is, however, a fundamental 
difference. The Federal Reserve is the central 
bank of a single country, despite all the diffe-
rences that may exist between the various us 
states. The coordination of monetary policy 
comes from a single entity, a single govern-
ment that directs actions in fiscal policy and 
a single government body that coordinates 
the funds. However, in the case of the ecb, 
the coordination of monetary policy with 
fiscal policy involves all eurozone members, 
who are different and unequal. The ecb has 
no power to force them to act as it can only 
recommend guidelines. This plurality in the 
transmission of monetary policy causes de-
lays in implementation. It is not only the 
very objectives that are implemented but 
also monetary policy that must be supported 
and coordinated with fiscal policy measures 
that work on an intergovernmental basis. It 
is apparent that as with the banking union, 
the states are not similar and therefore it is 
more difficult to get resources to implement 
all these measures. An example of this is the 
negotiation of the financing of the banking 
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union. Among the main obstacles, the project 
has raised concerns regarding who and how 
the resources will be provided to help troubled 
banks. In the absence of a common treasury 
in the euro area, the search for funding to 
implement the banking union completely 
becomes a nineteen-sided political negotia-
tion. The agility and consistency of monetary 
policy are diminished by national fiscal poli-
cies (Yiangou et al., 2013).
Despite these drawbacks and difficulties, 
the ecb is the Community institution that has 
gained power within the system of economic 
governance of the eu, not only in the case of 
financial banking supervision, but also in a 
position of de facto guarantor of last resource. 
Different studies have recently appeared ana-
lysing the rise of power from the perspective 
of the neo-functionalist and liberal intergo-
vernmentalist theory (Chang, 2015). This is 
a starting point for analysing the future role 
the ecb will play and the implications it has 
for the whole of eu institutions and the future 
of the Union (Schwarcer, 2012). Should we 
prioritise the interests of the member states or 
the interest of the eu as a super state?
conclusIons
Following the completion of this comparative 
analysis of the monetary policies of the Fed 
and the ecb during the 2007-2014 period, 
we have reached the following conclusions:
The monetary policy strategy of the ecb 
and the Federal Reserve during the crisis 
has been different and remains manifestly 
divergent and contradictory. While the Fed 
withdrew the stimulus plan of qe by the end 
of 2014, the ecb planned to implement its 
first phase in early 2015.
On the one hand, the US central bank 
and the eurozone acted in a coordinated 
manner in the management of open market 
operations by intervening in the markets to 
provide them with liquidity. The manage-
ment of exchange rates was deferred. If the 
Fed lowered interest rates for the first time in 
August 2007, we had to wait until October 
2008 for the ecb to do the same. This is due 
to several reasons. Firstly, the crisis originated 
in the us and it seems appropriate that the first 
bank to act was the Fed. However, financial 
markets are global and us risk soon spread to 
the rest of the international markets, which 
forced other central banks to act to protect 
their troubled markets.
Secondly, the mandate of the Federal 
Reserve is broader than the ecb and therefore 
relies on more assumptions when it comes to 
acting. The Fed has the objective of ensur-
ing economic growth, full employment and 
moderate inflation, all with the same rank 
of importance. In addition to this, the Fed 
is responsible for controlling the stability of 
the financial system and supervising financial 
institutions. On the other hand, the ecb’s 
mandate it is more limited. Before the crisis, 
controlling inflation within a limit of 2% on 
average was established as a priority. It also 
contributes to other objectives of the Euro-
pean Union and encourages economic growth 
and full employment. The problem is that 
there is a hierarchical relationship between its 
goals. Therefore, the ecb acted later than the 
Fed because inflation did not give it sufficient 
signals to intervene. That is, by relying on such 
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legitimacy in procedure, the ecb delivered 
on that functionality. The problem was that 
the dimension of the crisis needed a broader 
intervention. The governments of the eu as a 
whole and the Community institutions gave 
priority to employment and economic growth, 
while the European Central Bank prioritised 
price stability. Although the reasoning justi-
fying this hierarchy of objectives was intended 
to maintain the political independence of the 
European Central Bank (Institute for Inter-
national Political Economy Berlin, 2014), 
it has revealed an inconsistency between the 
objectives of the ecb of a technical nature and 
objectives of the member states, which are 
more political. This sometimes caused oppos-
ing expansionary fiscal policies and instability 
in interest rates to curb inflation. This is due 
to the heterogeneity of the eurozone, different 
realities defended by the governments of the 
member states and a single monetary policy, 
equal for all. However, the need for the ecb 
to play a more active role has encouraged the 
ecb’s responsibilities to be revised and expand-
ed in some cases. The weakness of this is that 
they have not changed the ecb’s responsibili-
ties in the Treaties because this would require 
unanimity among the States of the European 
Union and would expand over time. This 
would also mean that the member states would 
have to lose some of their autonomy.
Thirdly, the Federal Reserve and the ecb 
are defined as independent central banks. 
However, the ecb’s independence is further 
guaranteed by different instruments. At the 
beginning of the crisis, the ecb acted under 
cover of that sovereignty. However, the need 
by States to extend its functions and to take 
a particular stance for economic growth and 
employment has demonstrated its political 
independence. The Federal Reserve has a 
theoretical independence, but in practice, 
there has been close coordination between the 
authorities of the Fed and the us government 
to support measures in monetary policy with 
other policies at government level.
Fourthly, the ecb has had to act during 
the debate of the economic governance model 
of the eu by which it is directly affected and 
which has been reformed during the economic 
crisis. That is, in addition to dealing with the 
economic difficulties there was widespread re-
form of the European structures of governance.
Fifthly, the ecb has nineteen partners and 
different organizations that manage monetary 
policy and this has created difficulties and lack 
of coordination between the ecb and that 
of the euro area. While Germany and other 
member states less affected by the crisis have 
opted for the ecb to pursue only its technical 
objectives and have followed a more austere 
fiscal policy, the Mediterranean countries 
have needed a more active role in managing 
an expansive policy. This meant that the ecb 
had to assume broader functions such as acting 
as a guarantor of last resort. The coordination 
of monetary policies of central banks and the 
actions of the political authorities have been 
crucial in helping to restore the confidence 
of the markets. Thus, for monetary policies 
and measures to be implemented swiftly and 
coherently with other policies, fiscal and 
wage policies, close coordination and an open 
dialogue between policy makers and politi-
cal authorities is necessary. Therefore, central 
banks have a leading role, but have required 
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government authorities to provide support 
to restore confidence in the financial system.
The ecb has emerged as the Community 
institution that has gained more power. The 
functions entrusted regarding the application 
of monetary policy measures are broader, in 
terms of banking supervision, and as de facto 
guarantor of last resort. However, this role that 
the ecb has acquired and that complements 
the system of economic governance of the eu 
has been well discussed by the member states, 
as it was not originally added to its statutory 
powers but through other legal means which 
are less clear. Discussions are still ongoing re-
garding the completion of the banking union 
and providing it with the functions exercised 
in its Statutes which are conferred to its acting 
procedural legitimacy. Therefore, the crisis has 
led to a reform of eu economic governance in 
which the European Central Bank has come 
to have increased power. However, it is still a 
system of economic governance with many 
weaknesses. The fundamental problem is that 
it lacks a complete model. In order to achieve 
this it is essential to have political negotiation, 
establish a plan of action to face the crisis and 
the provision of resources to implement the 
policies and regulate actions of institutions. In 
short, the balance of power between the states 
and the Union remains the main stumbling 
block in the progress of the integration process 
of the European Union. Political negotiations 
of member states are key to determining the fu-
ture of economic governance in the Union and 
therefore its ability to face future challenges.
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